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ABSTRACT 
 
The integration and acceptance of routine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operations within the civilian airspace 
system hinges on the ability of UAV developers, operators and regulators to prove that UAVs, at minimum, have an 
equivalent level of safety to that of human-piloted aircraft. Regulations, which govern the safe design, manufacture, 
maintenance and operation of UAV systems, are to be defined so as to ensure this safety objective is met. Therefore, 
it is important to provide discussion on the definition and application of such safety objectives to ensure appropriate 
requirements are defined.  
 
Safety objectives are defined using a historical analysis of human-piloted aviation accidents. The results of this 
empirical analysis are then compared against those proposed in draft regulations and in similar studies. The 
limitations to the approach and the metrics used are also discussed. 
 
A simple ground fatality expectation model is used to illustrate the impact that varying safety objectives have on the 
design and operation of UAVs. Specific applications of border security, operations over urban environments and 
precision farming in the sugarcane industry are investigated.  
 
The final section of this paper provides discussion on the public acceptance of risk. The paper highlights a number 
of key factors which influence the acceptance of risk and the impact these factors have on the definition of safety 
objectives.   
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Introduction 
 
In order for the full potential of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) systems to be realised UAVs 
require unencumbered access to the civilian 
airspace system (CAS) (1). The acceptance of UAV 
systems by both regulatory bodies and the general 
public alike, hinges on maintaining the perceived 
level of safety of the current airspace environment. 
UAVs must be able to integrate seamlessly (2,3) 
into the existing airspace environment without 
increasing the risk posed to other airspace users and 
persons or property on the ground (4). The 
proposed safety baseline is that UAV systems 
establish, as a minimum, an Equivalent Level of 
Safety (ELOS) to that of corresponding human-
piloted operations (1-4). 
 
The current Class A mishap rate of UAV systems is 
approximately two orders of magnitude poorer than 
human-piloted aircraft (5-7). With the absence of 
an accepted regulatory framework, the high risk in 
UAV operations is managed by placing restrictions 
on where UAVs are operated. These restrictions 
include segregating UAV activities from other 
airspace users and limiting UAV operations to over 
sparsely populated areas (8). Until UAVs can prove 
an ELOS to manned aircraft such restrictions will 
remain a barrier to routine operations within the 
CAS and will significantly limit the number of 
commercially viable applications for the 
technology.  
 
At the foundation of this regulatory framework 
under which UAV systems are to be designed and 
operated, is the definition of safety objectives. 
These objectives are the standards to which rules 
governing the airworthiness and operation of UAV 
systems are defined. In general, the higher the 
safety objective, the more rigorous the regulations 
and the operational restrictions applied. However, 
the benefit of a higher level of safety comes at a 
cost. Over-zealous regulation has the potential to 
impede the industry. Therefore, it is necessary to 
provide discussion on the factors important in the 
development of safety objectives for UAVs and to 
investigate whether the current requirement for an 
ELOS is a suitable benchmark for the future 
regulation of UAV systems within the CAS (9). 
 
There are a number of studies (3,6,10-12) and even 
draft regulations (13,14) which propose safety 
objectives for UAV systems. The majority of these 
approaches rely on a model relating an acceptable 
safety objective to the crash probability 
requirement for a system. An example is the 
fatality approach first proposed in the 
JAA/EUROControl Task Force Report (3) and 
adopted for discussion in the European Aviation 
Safety Agency, Advanced-Notice of Proposed 
Amendment, A-NPA No 16-2005 (13).  
 
This approach uses an acceptable fatality objective 
of one fatality per million flight hours. Reference is 
made to an empirical study completed by the US 
Navy (15) from which the objective was taken, 
however there is no further justification for its use. 
This fatality objective, in conjunction with a model 
of the air vehicle kinetic energy, lethal area and 
distribution of population, is then used to establish 
an acceptable system crash probability. This system 
crash probability can be used to define a 
certification basis (3,6,13) and in turn requirements 
on the design and operation of the system. 
 
There are a number of different models used but all 
rely on some measure of acceptable safety. In most 
cases there is tentative justification for its use. 
 
The first section of this paper investigates the 
challenges to defining a safety objective for UAV 
systems based on a historical study of human-
piloted aviation performance. The purpose of this 
section is not to propose a suitable safety objective 
but to emphasise the issues important in their 
definition. 
 
The second section illustrates the importance of 
appropriate safety objectives. A simple fatality 
expectation model is used to illustrate the impact 
safety objectives have on the design and operation 
of UAVs. 
 
The final section provides discussion on the 
challenges of acceptance of the risks of UAV 
technologies. 
 
 
1 Empirical Safety Objectives 
 
The overall safety objective for UAVs is that of 
equivalence to a human-piloted aircraft. Such a 
comparative benchmark is a logical starting point 
as one could argue that human-piloted aircraft have 
been operating to an acceptably “safe” standard for 
over half a century. This safety objective is 
determined using a historical study of human-
piloted aviation safety performance.  
 
Under the requirement for an ELOS it is first 
necessary to quantify what the current level of 
safety is for human-piloted aviation. The process 
starts with the identification of hazards common to 
human-piloted and unmanned systems. A historical 
review of human-piloted aviation accidents is then 
completed to characterise the likelihood and 
consequence of these hazards. 
 
The observed figures are then used to establish a 
“de-facto” (16) safety benchmark for equivalent 
UAV systems and operations. This relies on an 
appropriate mechanism for comparison between 
human-piloted and unmanned systems. This 
process is outlined in Figure 1. This section 
follows this process, identifying key points which 
need to be considered in the definition of safety 
objectives. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Current Approach for the Definition of 
UAV Safety Objectives 
1.1 The Safety Performance of Human-
piloted Aviation Activity 
 
The overall safety requirement for UAV systems is 
that of equivalence to the current level of “safety” 
of human-piloted aircraft. Therefore, in order to 
define what UAV safety objectives should be, it is 
necessary to determine what the current level of 
safety of human-piloted aviation is. 
 
Manned aircraft activity presents a hazard to people 
onboard the aircraft, those onboard other aircraft 
and to people on the ground (3,10,16,17). In this 
paper, the scope of discussion is restricted to those 
hazardous conditions that present a risk to human 
life, illustrated in Figure 2. The discussion does not 
consider the risk aviation hazards present to the 
environment or broader societal values (18). 
However, these are important factors which must 
be taken into consideration when addressing the 
issue of public acceptance of a hazardous 
technology (19). Discussion on hazards other than 
those presenting a risk to human life is provided in 
the final section of this paper. 
 
The study assumes, for human-piloted aviation 
activity, that the only risks to human life can be 
attributed to the hazards of discontinued flight 
leading to an impact with the ground or a midair 
collision, Figure 2.  
 
A review of aviation accidents recorded by the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was 
conducted to gain a better understanding of the 
hazards illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Primary Hazards of Human-piloted 
Aviation Activity 
 
An analysis of the NTSB accident database (20), 
over the period 1984 to 2004, revealed that only 
19.4% of accidents recorded resulted in a fatality. 
Of these fatal accidents, only 1.4% (0.26% of all 
accidents recorded) resulted in ground fatalities. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the recorded 
accidents expressed in terms of the observed 
number of accidents per flight hour of operation*. 
 
Observed 
Accident Rate 
Observed number of 
accidents per flight hour 
Accident**  5.60 x 10-05 
Accident resulting 
in a fatality  1.09 x 10
-05
 
Accident resulting 
in a fatality on the 
ground 
1.48 x 10-07 
Table 1 – General Accident Rates 
* Accident rates calculated using estimated flight 
hours for general aviation, air carrier and air 
commuter/taxi activity figures recorded by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) over the 
entire period of analysis. 
 
** The NTSB defines an accident as “an 
occurrence associated with the operation of an 
aircraft which takes place between the time any 
person boards the aircraft with the intention of 
flight and all such persons have disembarked, and 
in which any person suffers death or serious injury, 
or in which the aircraft receives substantial 
damage” (21) 
 
Less than 1% of the 27,404 fatalities recorded in 
the NTSB database were people on the ground with 
the remaining fatalities all people onboard aircraft. 
It is clear from these figures and the rates presented 
in Table 1, that the hazards of human-piloted 
aviation present the highest risk to those onboard 
the aircraft. This finding supports the risk 
management approach adopted for human-piloted 
aviation which concentrates on the control of 
hazards posing a risk to crew and passengers 
(9,12). 
 
Before the safety performance figures observed for 
human-piloted aviation can be used to provide 
guidance on the safety objectives for UAVs it is 
necessary to identify those hazards common to both 
human-piloted and unmanned operations, Figure 1.  
 
1.2 Common Hazards of Human-piloted and 
Unmanned Aviation Activity 
 
With the absence of a crew onboard and with the 
assumption that the public will not embrace UAVs 
as a form of transportation in the immediate future 
(22); the only risks to human life are to those 
people onboard other aircraft and those on the 
ground. This is depicted in Figure 3. 
 
The majority of current civilian UAV operations 
are performed in segregated airspace however there 
is an increasing need for unimpeded access to the 
CAS.  This will require UAV systems to operate 
transparently (3) alongside manned aviation.  
Therefore the hazard of a midair collision and thus 
the risks to people on the ground and onboard other 
aircraft are common to both human-piloted and 
unmanned aircraft activity.  
 
UAVs also present a risk to people on the ground. 
 
Figure 3 - Primary Hazards of UAV Aviation 
Activity 
 
This can be attributed to any hazard leading to an 
impact with the ground (collectively referred to as 
the hazard of discontinued flight) or the hazard of 
falling debris as a result of a midair collision, 
Figure 3. The risk presented to people on the 
ground is common to all air vehicles. 
 
1.3 Historical Analysis of Hazard 
Performance 
 
The next step is to quantify the common hazards 
between human-piloted and unmanned aircraft. As 
shown in Figure 3 these are the primary hazards of 
midair collision and discontinued flight. 
 
1.3.1 Human-piloted Aviation - Onboard 
Fatality Risk 
 
For UAV operations, the principal risk to people 
onboard aircraft is due to the hazard of a midair 
collision between a UAV and human-piloted 
aircraft. 
 
From an investigation of the NTSB accident 
database (20), it was observed that only 0.7% of all 
accidents were the result of a midair collision, 
approximately 56% of which were fatal.  Given a 
midair collision, only 1% resulted in fatalities on 
the ground. Table 2 provides a summary of these 
figures in terms of the observed number of 
occurrences per flight hour. 
 
Observed 
Accident Rate 
Observed number of 
accidents per flight hour 
Midair accident  4.10 x 10-07 
Fatal midair 
accident  2.32 x 10
-07
 
Midair accident 
resulting in a 
fatality on the 
ground 
4.4 x 10-09 
Observed 
Fatality Rate 
Observed number of 
fatalities per flight hour 
Fatality Rate 
Onboard Aircraft 8.08 x 10
-07
 
Fatality Rate on 
the Ground 2.22 x 10
-08
 
Table 2 – Midair Collision Accident and Fatality 
Rates 
 
Under the requirement for an ELOS, these figures 
provide an estimate of the expected level of risk of 
UAV operations alongside other aircraft.  It is 
important to note that this does not take into 
consideration the type of operation performed (for 
example aerobatic displays), whether the operation 
was performed under instrument flight rules (IFR) 
or visual flight rules (VFR), weather conditions, 
type of air traffic management services provided or 
the equipage of the aircraft (For example: the use 
of collision avoidance equipment or radios).  These 
figures only show the safety objective observed for 
all human-piloted aircraft and operations in terms 
of the expected number of accidents and fatalities 
per average flight hour.  
 
It is interesting to note that due to the absence of 
people onboard a UAV and assuming that 
comparable separation services are provided and an 
equivalent see and avoid capability exists, then the 
rate of fatality due to the hazard of a midair 
collision will be lower than that observed for 
human-piloted aircraft. Theoretically, UAVs could 
exceed the midair collision accident rate by a 
significant margin but still satisfy the safety 
objective in terms of fatalities. This highlights the 
limitations of an approach based solely on the rate 
of fatality, as such a scenario would be 
unacceptable. 
 
1.3.2 Human-piloted Aviation - Ground 
Fatality Risk 
 
A review of the NTSB database was completed to 
determine the number of people killed by falling 
aircraft or debris from a midair collision.  Fatalities 
were categorised by type of risk exposure, either 
voluntary or involuntary. A fatality was categorised 
as voluntary if the fatally injured person was 
associated with the aviation activity taking place or 
was knowingly exposing themselves to risk.  
Examples of fatalities categorised as voluntary 
include: people struck while walking on runways, 
people acting as markers for crop spraying 
activities or ground crew killed when coming in 
contact with a spinning propeller.  Involuntary 
ground fatalities were those accidents where people 
had no association with the aviation activity and no 
control over their exposure to risk.  Involuntary 
fatalities are indicative of the risk to the general 
public due to the hazards of discontinued flight and 
falling debris. Similar exposure categorisations are 
used in (10,23).  
 
From an analysis of the NTSB Accident Database it 
was observed that 54% of all ground fatalities 
recorded could be categorised as involuntary. 
Figure 4 shows the number of involuntarily 
exposed ground fatalities and corresponding annual 
involuntary ground fatality rate.  Table 3 provides a 
summary of the involuntary ground fatality 
observations expressed in terms of the expected 
number of fatalities per flight hour of operation.  
Table 3 also shows the figures derived in similar 
empirical studies and those safety objectives 
proposed in draft regulations.  (23,24) also provide 
figures for the risk of ground fatalities due to 
aviation activity. 
 
Ground Fatalities per Million 
Flight Hours 
Type 
NTSB 
Analysis* 
Weibel$ 
(10,17) 
Navy% 
(6,15) 
General 
Aviation 0.084 0.5 0.466 
Air Taxi 
and 
Commuter 
0.0997 N/A 
Air 
Carrier 0.0313 0.5 
0.7 
Commercial 
Aviation ^ 
All 0.076  N/A 1.0& 
* Over the period 1984 to 2004, NTSB database. 
$ Based on NTSB Air Carrier data (1984-1999) 
and General Aviation data (1983-2003) 
%
 Based on NTSB data over the period 1982-
1998 
^Includes involuntary and voluntarily exposed 
ground fatalities 
&Common safety objective (3,6,25) 
Table 3 – Ground Fatality Rates by Part 
 Figure 4 – Involuntary Ground Fatalities (NTSB) 
 
1.3.3 Discussion on the Results of Empirical 
Analysis 
 
Before discussing the application of the observed 
safety objectives to that of UAV systems, it is 
necessary to highlight some of the important issues 
behind the empirical approach used. 
 
A number of differences can be observed in the 
figures contained in Table 3.  These differences are 
primarily due to the varying time periods chosen 
for analysis and whether distinction was made 
between those accepting of risk and those exposed 
involuntarily. Other differences can be attributed to 
the inclusion of incidents which occurred outside 
United States borders or the estimates of hourly 
aviation activity used in calculating rates.  
 
Performing any empirical analysis over time will 
introduce biases. The challenge is providing 
justification for the period chosen. Irrespective of 
the actual metric used, what historical period of 
analysis should be used? From Figure 4, for a 
number of years the observed ground fatality rate 
was zero. The use of such figures could result in 
the definition of unrealistic safety objectives.  
 
The FAA uses a three year average for evaluating 
safety performance metrics (26), but why three 
years? If a three year average is used, the observed 
safety performance in terms of involuntary ground 
fatalities per flight hour would be 3.6 x 10-08. This 
is approximately half that observed over the 21-
year period. Theoretically UAVs could cause twice 
as many fatalities under a safety objective based on 
the 21 year period as opposed to one calculated 
over three years. The period of analysis is thus an 
important factor in the definition of safety 
objectives. 
 
Finally, the analysis does not consider variation of 
the observed fatality rate with geographical 
location. A similar analysis (23) of involuntary 
ground fatalities found that the risk of ground 
fatality could vary by up to two orders of 
magnitude with distance from major airports.  
 
1.4 Mechanism for Comparison  
 
Should UAVs be as safe as general aviation, 
scheduled air carriers or light sport aircraft? 
 
The general approach is to adopt one safety 
objective for all categorisations of UAV systems 
and operations. (3,25) use a single criterion of 
1x10-06 fatalities per flight hour which was 
arbitrarily selected based on the observed historical 
data. The justification for this is that the type of 
aircraft classification is irrelevant to the person 
killed on the ground. The application of a single 
safety objective to all UAV categorisations and 
operations is further discussed in the following 
section. In addition, public acceptance may require 
distinction between UAV categorisations based on 
the type of operation performed. This is further 
discussed in section three of this paper. 
1.5 Discussion on the Use of a Fatality Metric 
 
This paper has only focussed on the most 
commonly used metric for characterising the safety 
objective: the risk of fatality per flight hour of 
operation. Two particular limitations to its use are: 
 
• Applicability to systems and operations where 
the risk of fatality is extremely low. 
• Reflects consequence, not hazard occurrence. 
 
Some UAVs may be statistically incapable of 
causing fatalities. In some cases the risk of a 
fatality is so low that it is statistically insignificant 
when compared to the errors and assumptions made 
in its measure. This is particularly relevant for 
smaller UAV systems which pose a minimal risk to 
human life, such as micro air vehicles. Instead, risk 
management activities should focus on the potential 
impact on the environment, property, UAV 
industry and societal perception as opposed to the 
possibility of fatalities. Take for example a small 
UAV operated in a sparsely populated area. Under 
a risk management strategy driven purely by the 
risk of fatality the reliability of the system could be 
extremely low but still meet the safety objective. At 
some point, there will be an adverse reaction by the 
public to having the UAV crash regularly in the 
area. Therefore a measure of risk in terms of 
fatalities is not applicable to all UAV systems. 
 
Another limitation to the use of a fatality metric as 
a sole measure of safety is that it does not reflect 
the occurrence of a hazard but more like a measure 
of its consequence. For example, in one theoretical 
month there was only one general aviation accident 
which resulted in the death of eight people. In the 
next month, for approximately the same number of 
general aviation hours, there were eight separate 
accidents each resulting in a single death. Under a 
fatality-only safety objective there is no difference 
in the safety performance between months. 
However, in the second month the accident rate 
was higher for the same fatality rate. The rate of 
accidents increased by eight times but this increase 
in hazard rate (risk) is not reflected in the safety 
metric. A similar example was outlined previously 
for the hazard of a midair collision between a UAV 
and human-piloted aircraft. As there are no people 
onboard a UAV the midair collision rate could be 
higher than that observed for human-piloted aircraft 
for the same fatality objective. 
 
There is one major advantage to using a measure of 
fatality as a safety objective and that is that it 
provides a universal measure for all risks to 
society. This is particularly important when 
addressing the issue of public acceptance, where 
comparisons against other technologies and 
ambient risks can be used to support the safety case 
put forward for UAV systems. 
 
2 The Impact of Safety Objectives 
 
Safety objectives must be defined so as to ensure a 
minimum level of safety equivalent to that 
exhibited by human-piloted operations. At the same 
time they should be appropriately set so as not to 
place unrealistic demands on the design of the 
system or over conservative restrictions on where 
operations can be conducted. This section 
investigates the impact of safety objectives on the 
design of different UAV systems and the 
restrictions on their operations. In turn this will 
determine the commercial viability of different 
UAV applications. 
 
The ground fatality per flight hour metric 
determined in the previous section is used to 
illustrate discussions on the appropriate definition 
of safety objectives. This is representative of the 
risk presented to the general public due to the 
operation of UAVs.  
  
A simple ground fatality expectation model is used 
to relate the safety objective to the design and 
operation of the UAV. The over-conservative 
model is similar to the approaches outlined in 
(3,6,10-12,17,27,28). The model is used to 
exemplify the impact safety objectives have on the 
design, operation and potential markets for UAVs. 
(10,17) complete similar studies but do not 
investigate the impact of varying safety objectives. 
The ground fatality expectation model is given in 
Equation 1. 
 
LAMRSO ××= ρ   Equation 1 
 
Where: 
 
• SO is the safety objective in terms of the 
expected number of ground fatalities per flight 
hour as determined in the previous section.  
 
• MR is the mishap rate (referred to as the crash 
probability objective (3,25) ) of the system per 
flight hour and is given in Equation 2.  
 
DebrisMCSFRMR += + Other Equation 2 
 
• ρ is the population density  
 
• AL is the lethal area calculated as the circular 
area with the diameter given by the air 
vehicle’s maximum dimension with the 
addition of a buffer for the width of an average 
person.   
 
• SFR is the system failure rate per flight hour 
and is the expected number of system failures 
leading to the discontinuance of flight (either 
controlled or uncontrolled).  
 
• MCDebris is the midair collision causing debris 
per flight hour.  
 
• Other refers to the numerous other hazards 
which could result in an undesired descent 
over a populated region. Such examples 
include extreme weather, acts of terrorism, bird 
strikes and human error. For the purposes of 
this analysis the model is restricted to the 
hazards depicted in Figure 3. 
 
To further simplify the model the MCDebris is 
assumed constant and no collision model is 
provided. Approximately one in five involuntary 
ground fatalities can be attributed to the hazard of 
debris from midair collision. This ratio is based on 
that observed for human-piloted aircraft. This 
assumes that UAVs, under the same traffic 
management environment and with an equivalent 
see and avoid capability, will exhibit the same 
fatality rate due to falling debris. This is an over 
conservative assumption particularly for small and 
micro UAV operations which are expected to be 
conducted at low altitude and hence outside of 
shared airspace. A midair collision model based on 
traffic flows, such as that derived in (10,17), would 
be needed to accurately represent the risk to people 
on the ground due to the hazard of midair collision. 
 
The simplified fatality expectation model does not 
take into consideration means for mitigation (such 
as flight termination systems), the kinetic energy of 
the vehicle (assumes no sheltering and that the 
probability of a fatality given a strike is 1), the type 
of failure mode (assumed vertical descent) or the 
nature of the distribution of people in the over 
flown areas (assumed uniform). Although over-
conservative, this model does provide a means for 
illustrating the impact safety objectives have on the 
UAV industry as well as the potential risk current 
UAV systems present to the general public. 
 
The analysis was conducted for the state of 
Queensland in Australia. The model used 
population data from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2001 Census at the collection district 
level (29). The Queensland population is 
concentrated to the eastern seaboard with the vast 
interior sparsely populated. A number of examples 
are also given for the South East Queensland 
Region which contains a number of densely 
populated centres as well as vast rural and 
agricultural areas. The regions under analysis are 
indicated in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Region Under Analysis, Queensland, 
Australia 
2.1 Impact of Safety Objectives- Operations 
 
A number of safety objectives were identified in 
the previous section. An analysis was completed to 
investigate the impact these safety objectives have 
on the operation of different types of UAV 
systems. Discussion of the impact these objectives 
have on particular operations is also provided. 
 
It is important to note that the model only shows 
where a UAV, with a given mishap rate, can crash 
without exceeding the safety objective in terms of 
ground fatalities per flight hour. However, if it is 
assumed that all mishaps only result in a purely 
vertical failure mode, then this analysis can be used 
to provide a rough indication as to where UAV 
operations can be performed in accordance with 
safety objectives. 
 
For low altitude operations, such as that of smaller 
UAVs, it can be assumed that if a failure occurs 
over a particular populated region that the aircraft 
will crash somewhere within that region. Therefore 
the error introduced in the assumption of a purely 
vertical failure mode can be assumed small. On the 
contrary, any analysis of UAVs which operate from 
higher altitudes, particularly medium and high 
altitude long endurance category systems, is 
limited. This is because a ground impact due to a 
mishap could potentially occur anywhere within a 
circle of radius equal to the maximum range at 
cruise and maximum gliding distance from cruise 
altitude. A more accurate estimate would require a 
model describing the UAV crash trajectory for a 
range of failure modes and debris patterns. 
 
In Figure 6i, the areas indicated in red (darker 
areas) illustrate where a Global Hawk mishap 
resulting in a vertical descent would exceed the 
ground fatality objective proposed by (3,6,25) of 
1x10-06 per flight hour. Figure 6ii illustrates the 
regions exceeding the safety objective observed for 
all human-piloted aviation of 7.6x10-08. These 
Figure 6i – 1 x 10-06 Involuntary 
Ground Fatalities per Flight Hour
Figure 6ii – 7.6 x 10-08 Involuntary 
Ground Fatalities per Flight Hour
Regions shaded red (darker areas) indicate where the safety objective in terms of involuntary ground 
fatalities per flight hour would be exceeded for Global Hawk operations assuming a vertical failure 
mode.
 Figure 6 – Global Hawk Analysis for a Purely Vertical Failure Mode 
 
 
results and those presented in Table 4, are based on 
an estimate of the current mishap rate for each 
UAV under investigation (30,31). The mishap rate 
for the Global Hawk is for the period up to 
September 2001 (31) and therefore is not a fair 
indication of the current system performance. 
Similarly, the mishap data used for the Predator B 
system is not a fair indication of system 
performance during flight as it is for all Class A 
mishaps (31). Class A mishaps include any loss of 
the system (during flight or on the ground), human 
life or those causing more than $1 Million in 
damage (31). The Aerosonde mishap rate is based 
on the general aircraft lifetime (30) unlike the 
figures used for the Global Hawk and Predator 
systems which are based on historical performance.  
 
Table 4 shows the results for all UAV systems, 
expressed in terms of the % area of Queensland 
where operations can be conducted.  
 
 
Safety Objective 
UAV System 1 x 10-06 7.6 x 10-08 
Aerosonde MkIII 98.8% 92.8% 
Predator B 98.7% 92.4% 
Global Hawk 90.7% 52.2% 
Table 4 - % Area of Queensland Where Operations 
of Different Types of UAV Can be Conducted 
Under Different Safety Objectives 
 
Table 4 indicates a number of interesting points. 
Firstly, there is variation between safety objectives, 
but this variation is more significant for the Global 
Hawk (38.5% reduction in operating area). This 
can be attributed to the distribution of population in 
Queensland. This is due to the concentration of 
population to small areas on the eastern seaboard. 
 
The safety objectives establish a threshold 
population density (ρ
 
1x10
-06
 and ρ
 
7.6x10
-08) above 
which UAVs are not permitted to operate in order 
to satisfy the safety objective. This is illustrated in 
Figure 7. Thus the impact expressed in terms of 
area is highly dependent on the distribution of 
population densities in the region under analysis. 
 
It is also interesting to note that there is very little 
difference between the results calculated for the 
Aerosonde and Predator B systems, Table 4. The 
Predator B has a MR 30 times less than that of the 
Aerosonde; however this is offset by the larger 
lethal area of the Predator B system. This 
highlights the need for a more comprehensive 
model incorporating factors such as the kinetic 
energy of the platform, population sheltering and 
the conditional probability of fatality given a hit 
(currently assumed as 1). For example the 
likelihood of an Aerosonde penetrating a structure 
and still having enough kinetic energy to inflict a 
fatal injury is significantly less than that for a 
Predator B and this is not reflected in the model 
used.  
 
Other conditional and somewhat secondary fatality 
causing factors, like the quantity of fuel onboard, 
nature of payload (for example agricultural 
chemicals) or type of building struck (for example 
a petroleum refinery) should be considered. 
 
 Figure 7 – Relationship between % Area and 
Population Density  
2.1.1 Border Security Example 
 
The example of border surveillance is used to 
illustrate the impact safety objectives have on 
potential UAV applications. Australia has 
thousands of miles of coastline, the majority of 
which is sparsely populated. Global Hawk, with a 
proven maximum endurance in excess of 31 hours 
(32), is particularly suited to the application of 
border protection. It can be seen in Figure 6ii that 
given the current mishap rate of the Global Hawk 
(31) and the assumption of a vertical failure mode, 
that any operation over the eastern seaboard is 
likely to exceed the safety precedence observed for 
human-piloted aircraft. However, operations over 
the far north of the state are unlikely to exceed the 
safety objective of 7.6x10-08 fatalities per flight 
hour. This is where illegal activities such as drug 
trafficking, people smuggling and illegal fishing 
are most prevalent. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that under either safety objective the Global Hawk 
can be operated in far north Queensland for the 
application of border protection. Operations along 
the eastern seaboard would have to be conducted 
further offshore. 
 
2.2 Impact of Safety Objectives on the Design 
of UAV Systems 
 
Safety objectives define the minimum system 
reliability and in turn have a direct influence on the 
cost of the system. A reliable system demands a 
high level of redundancy and assurance in critical 
components. High reliability comes at the cost of 
increased takeoff weight, reduced payload capacity, 
reduced performance and an overall increase in 
outright and ongoing system costs. (33) presents a 
rough but illustrative example of the impact system 
safety requirements have on the takeoff weight and 
in turn cost of a UAV system. 
2.2.1 Urban Operations Example 
There are a number of potential commercial 
applications for UAVs over densely populated 
areas. Applications include the provision of 
wireless communications, law enforcement, town 
planning and environmental monitoring. An 
analysis was completed to determine the impact 
safety objectives would have on the minimum 
mishap rate for UAVs operating in certain zones 
over Brisbane city. Figure 7 shows the operating 
zones of 0-5km, 5-10km and 10km-20km centred 
on the Brisbane central business district (CBD). 
 
Figure 8 is a graph of the maximum mishap rate 
per flight hour required to meet varying safety 
objectives for the operation of a Predator B in the 
zones indicated in Figure 7. From this graph it can 
be seen that the mishap rate for operations over 
predominantly residential areas (10-20km zone) 
can be approximately four times higher than that 
directly over the Brisbane CBD (0-5km zone). 
However, this does not reflect public acceptance of 
mishaps in different areas. For example, the public 
is less likely to accept a mishap in a residential area 
over a mishap in an industrial area despite 
comparable fatality probabilities. 
 
 
Figure 7 – 5km, 10km and 20km Zones Around 
Brisbane Central Business District 
 
The Predator B mishap rate used was 170 x 10-06 
mishaps per flight hour.  From Figure 8 it can be 
seen that the Predator B system could not operate 
over the CBD or regions up to 20km from it under 
any of the safety objectives analysed. 
 
The linear appearance of the required mishap rate 
with distance is due to the distribution of 
population with increasing distance from the CBD. 
A more detailed model incorporating sheltering and 
kinetic energy would provide a more realistic 
estimation of the potential fatalities. Despite a 
higher density of people in the CBD, the type and 
concentration of structures may provide more 
protection than that of residential dwellings. It is 
important to note that the population density data 
used in this model is a count of people residing in 
the region at night. During working hours the 
population density in the CBD rises significantly 
and reduces in the predominantly residential areas 
surrounding the CBD. Temporal and even seasonal  
% Area of 
QLD with 
population 
density ≥ ρ 
100% 
0 Population 
density, ρ 
 ρ7.6x10
-08 
 ρ
 
1x10
-06 
 52% 
% Area of Region vs Population Density 
 Figure 8 – Required Mishap Rate to Operate Within 0-5km, 5-10km and 10-20km Zones of Brisbane CBD for 
Predator  
 
variations would need to be considered in a more 
detailed model. 
 
The previous example is illustrative of the risk to 
the general public for operations over populous 
areas. However particular applications, such as 
precision agriculture, will have different 
requirements on the maximum acceptable mishap 
rate and hence design requirements on the system. 
A practical example is that of the application of 
small UAVs to precision agriculture and in 
particular that of the sugar industry. 
 
2.2.2 Precision Farming Example 
 
Queensland produces 95% of Australian sugar 
production and generates AU$1.26 Billion in 
exports each year (34). A potential application for 
UAVs is in the area of crop management and 
environmental monitoring. One of the largest sugar 
producing districts in Queensland is that of the 
Burdekin Shire. Table 6 shows the minimum 
system failure rate required for an Aerosonde-sized 
UAV to operate over the Burdekin (sugarcane 
region) and Brisbane CBD regions. The analysis 
for Burdekin is based on an average population 
density observed in the cane growing areas. As 
precision farming is likely to be conducted at low 
altitude (below 500ft AGL) the hazard of debris 
due to a midair collision can be assumed zero and 
hence the mishap rate calculated using Equation 2 
can be equated to the minimum system failure rate 
of the UAV system. 
 
It can be seen from Table 6 that inherently riskier 
operations, like those over the Brisbane CBD, 
demand a system failure rate approximately 1000 
times stricter than that for an operation over rural 
areas. This highlights the fact that the intended 
operation should drive the required level of safety. 
This is not just due to the respective population 
densities but the nature of risk exposure. For sugar 
cane growing areas the principal risk is to 
sugarcane farmers. Sugarcane farmers voluntarily 
accept some element of risk in return for the 
benefits gained from the use of the UAV and hence 
a higher level of risk exposure is tolerated. The use 
of safety objectives based on involuntarily exposed 
fatalities is therefore over conservative. 
Conversely, the risk due to operations over the 
Brisbane CBD are to the general public who may 
not perceive any direct benefit from the UAV 
operation. Hence the nature of exposure is 
involuntary and a correspondingly higher degree of 
safety is mandated. Therefore, the three orders of 
magnitude difference in the required UAV system 
failure rate is likely to be conservative. 
 
Required System 
Failure Rate  
(per flight hour) 
Safety Objective 
(Ground Fatalities 
per Flight Hour) Sugar Region 
(Burdekin) Brisbane CBD 
Common Criteria 
1 x 10-06 1.16x10
-02
 9.73x10-06 
All Aircraft  
7.6 x 10-08 8.78x10
-04
 7.39x10-07 
Table 6 – Required System Failure Rate for 
Sugarcane Precision Farming and Operations Over 
Brisbane CBD (Aerosonde) 
This example exemplifies the importance of a 
flexible safety regulation approach which takes into 
consideration both the magnitude of risk as well as 
the nature of the exposure. It would be difficult to 
justify the application of a one-size fits all safety 
regulation for all UAV operations. In terms of the 
safety objective used, there is no justification in 
regulating all UAVs to criteria derived from the 
safety performance of all human-piloted aviation. 
This would place unrealistic demands on the design 
and operation of UAV systems, rendering some 
applications, such as precision farming, 
economically unviable. 
 
In some cases the economic risk will be a larger 
driver for system reliability than the safety 
requirements for the system. If a UAV carries a 
payload which greatly exceeds the cost of the 
platform, the economic cost of system attrition will 
drive the required mishap rate of the system and 
not that of the safety performance. Conversely, 
there are a number of applications which demand a 
low-cost and almost expendable system. The 
principal driver for design reliability and hence 
commercial viability of the system for such 
applications hinges on the level of safety 
requirements mandated. 
2.3 Summary 
 
A number of examples were presented to highlight 
the impact safety objectives have on the design and 
operation of UAV systems. Safety objectives 
should be defined and applied taking into 
consideration the magnitude and the nature of risk 
exposure of the intended application. This will 
ensure that safety requirements on the UAV system 
provide an acceptable level of safety without 
making unrealistic demands on the industry. 
 
 
3  Equivalence versus Acceptance 
 
The regulation of human-piloted aircraft has been 
driven by the risk to the people onboard. For UAV 
systems the risk management paradigm has shifted 
to the protection of those unwillingly exposed to 
the hazards of UAV activity. From the outset of 
this paper the assumption was made that an ELOS 
was a logical starting point for the regulation of 
UAV systems leading to the acceptance of UAV 
operations in civilian airspace. Is this assumption 
valid? Will equivalence result in acceptance? 
 
It is important to note that this question relates to 
the public’s acceptance of the risks associated with 
a new technology and not the public’s acceptance 
of a new technology. The quantification of an 
acceptable level of risk, although an important 
factor, is only one component characterising the 
public’s acceptance of a technology (18,19). Other 
complex and often immeasurable factors such as 
morals and the economic and political climate are 
equally as important.  
 
A survey of aviation users identified job losses for 
pilots as a concern to the public (22). This is a good 
example of a social factor influencing the public 
acceptance of UAV technologies but not the 
acceptance of the risks associated with the 
technology. A study characterising these complex 
social factors and importantly a means to address 
them, is necessary before acceptance of civil UAV 
operations can become a reality. 
 
This section cannot hope to identify all the complex 
factors influencing the public’s acceptance of the 
risks due to UAV operations. The objective is only 
to provide discussion on some of the key issues 
which need to be addressed. Until a detailed study 
is completed, it is necessary to look to existing 
literature and the acceptance of similar 
technologies to gain insight into the factors 
influencing public acceptance. 
 
In most cases, society has opposed any new 
technology that has associated risks (19). Such 
examples include nuclear power generation and fly-
by-wire commercial jet aircraft. In the case of UAV 
technologies, it is expected that the public will 
place higher demands on the safety of UAV 
operations than that of manned aircraft operations.  
 
3.1 Introduction to Risk Acceptance 
 
Everyday we make decisions based on risk and 
benefit. An example is a commuter’s choice to ride 
a bicycle to work as opposed to catching the bus. 
Choosing to ride a bicycle exposes the commuter to 
a higher level of personal risk however they do 
receive some sort of benefit in return. This may be 
a sense of self satisfaction and wellbeing for 
choosing a healthy and environmentally friendly 
mode of transportation. In this example, the 
benefits of the commuter’s risk taking decision are 
relatively apparent, albeit difficult to measure, and 
the choice to partake in this activity was voluntary.  
 
However, the level of risk the commuter is willing 
to accept will be much less for those situations 
where he or she has no direct control over their risk 
exposure and/or those hazardous situations where 
there is no direct benefit to them personally. Such 
an example of involuntary risk exposure is that of a 
crashing UAV. The commuter’s demand for 
protection from this hazardous situation will be 
higher despite the fact that he or she chooses to 
partake in a form of transportation where the 
likelihood of personal injury is orders of magnitude 
greater. 
 
Distinctions must be made between those UAV 
applications where the principal risk exposure is 
voluntary from those of involuntary risk exposure. 
This is because the public places a higher demand 
for protection from involuntary risks as opposed to 
voluntary. Research has indicated that this extra 
level of protection can be as much as 1000 times 
more (35). The nature of risk exposure is therefore 
an important factor in the definition of acceptable 
risk criteria. This was identified in the example of 
UAV applications in the sugarcane industry. The 
principal risks were to the cane farm workers and 
hence requirements should reflect the voluntary 
nature of this application. Operations where the 
principal risk is to the general public (or other 
airspace users) should be subject to more rigorous 
safety requirements. 
 
The basic theory behind the acceptance of risk is 
the subjective assessment between: 
 
• Society’s perception of the level of exposure to 
the hazard 
• Society’s perception of the benefits due to the 
hazardous activity (19,35,36) 
 
3.2 Risk Perception 
 
The previous sections of this document have 
detailed a method for the objective measure of the 
likelihood of a hazardous event. This is based on a 
quantitative measure of historical safety 
performance. However, there are substantial 
differences in what is measured and what is 
perceived (35). Risk perception, and not the 
objective measure of risk, will be the driver behind 
the acceptance of UAV operations in civilian 
airspace. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the 
key factors influencing the perception of risk. 
 
The perception of risk is driven by the magnitude 
of consequence more so than the associated 
likelihood of occurrence (18,19,35). Public 
perception of risk focuses on those hazards which 
have the potential to cause large consequences, 
such as that of a midair collision between a UAV 
and a commercial passenger aircraft.  These 
hazardous situations, despite their likelihood, must 
meet a higher public expectation than those hazards 
of less severe consequence of higher likelihood, 
such as that of an impact with the ground. 
 
Societal values and obligations are an important 
factor in the perception of risk (18,19,35). Take for 
example three UAV crash scenarios, none of which 
result in fatalities. One UAV crashes in a park, 
another in a nature reserve, and the last in the 
grounds of a cemetery. The objective measure of 
risk assumes each scenario has equal consequence 
in terms of fatalities. However, the public is likely 
to make a subjective distinction between the 
consequences of these accidents. These distinctions 
would be based on the values and ethical 
obligations held by society. Such community 
values and ethical obligations should be taken into 
consideration in the assessment of UAV operations. 
 
Fear of the unknown has a major influence on the 
perception of risk (19). This is due to an 
uncertainty in a technology and lack of 
understanding in its capability. Current perceptions 
are likely to be driven by the limited exposure the 
public has to UAV technologies. Take for example 
the movie Stealth, released by Columbia Pictures in 
2005. Stealth presented a futuristic scenario where 
an armed UAV develops a mind of its own and 
threatens to destroy its creators. Those with 
knowledge in the area can see the fallacies in this 
scenario and enjoy the movie purely for its 
entertainment value. However, those movie goers 
with a limited awareness of the current capabilities 
of UAVs may leave with the instilled 
misconception of UAVs as robotic killing 
machines. This perception is likely to influence 
their judgement on the risks of UAV technologies 
until future exposure to the technology proves 
otherwise. Building public awareness and 
familiarity with UAV technologies will be an 
important aspect to gaining acceptance of the 
technology. 
 
The fear of the unknown also introduces a 
dependency between the perception of risk and 
time. The public reaction towards a UAV incident 
is likely to be more severe in the early stages of 
civilian operations. Such an example of this time 
dependency of technological risk perception is the 
introduction of the Airbus A320. The A320 was the 
first fully certified commercial passenger aircraft to 
have digital flight control (fly-by-wire). Despite 
obtaining certification, there was a great deal of 
public apprehension towards the new technology. 
Subsequently, the first A320 accident at the 
Habsheim air show on the 26th of June 1988 
attracted a significant public response. However, 18 
years later, the public readily fly on A320 aircraft. 
 
3.3 Perception of Benefits 
 
The perceived benefit from a hazardous activity 
directly influences an individual’s willingness to 
accept risk. It has been shown (35) that the level of 
benefit awareness is directly proportional to the 
acceptable level of risk. This is indicated in Figure 
9 presented in (35). 
 Figure 9 – Benefit Awareness versus Acceptable 
Risk for Different Technologies (35) 
 
For human-piloted aviation, the benefits are easily 
identifiable to the general public, in that most 
would associate human-piloted aviation with the 
benefits of efficient transportation of people and 
freight. However, this was not always the case. In 
the early periods of human-piloted flight, the 
immediate benefits of aviation to the general public 
were not so clear. For human-piloted aviation 
widespread awareness of the benefits only 
eventuated with successful public applications, 
principally the start of commercial passenger 
transportation. A similar situation exists for UAV 
technologies. As UAV applications develop so to 
will an awareness of their benefits and this will be 
reflected in the level of acceptability in their risks. 
 
Therefore it is important that the UAV industry 
acknowledges the relationship between benefit 
awareness and acceptability of risk. Initiatives 
should be undertaken to foster awareness in the 
general public. Familiarity with the technology, as 
well as its benefits, will also reduce the risk due to 
the uncertainty in the unknown.  
 
In addition, the perceived benefit coupled with 
societal values and obligations may result in 
different levels of acceptance for different types of 
UAV operations. (19) identifies a number of 
personal judgements which impact on an 
individuals’ attitude towards a technology and 
hence the acceptance of its associated risks. It is 
likely that the public will make a distinction 
between those operations which provide a “greater 
good” (for example fire fighting or search and 
rescue) and those operations which have only 
limited community benefit.  
 
3.4 Summary 
 
This section has only touched on the complex area 
of risk acceptance. The objective was to identify a 
number of important issues which need to be taken 
into consideration. Despite the emphasis of this 
section on the factors important in the definition of 
“acceptable” risk criteria it should be noted that 
public perception should not be the sole driver for 
the development of safety objectives for UAVs: 
 
“If decisions were based entirely upon public 
perception, many technologies would not exist now 
because an exaggerated fear of new risks would 
have prohibited their introduction” (35) 
 
Further study, particularly in the area of risk 
perception, is needed to better characterise the 
acceptance of civilian UAV operations. 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
The overall safety requirement for UAV systems is 
that of equivalence to human-piloted aviation. The 
objective of this paper was to discuss the issues 
important in the process of defining and applying 
an “equivalent” safety objective to UAV systems. 
 
A historical analysis of human-piloted aviation 
accidents was completed and the results compared 
to those proposed in draft regulations and similar 
studies. Variation between the results of studies 
makes it difficult to justify the use of a single 
figure. A number of limitations on the use of the 
fatality metric as a safety objective were also 
discussed. The main limitations were the 
applicability to UAV operations where the risk of 
fatality is small and the fact that they do not reflect 
the rate of occurrence of hazards. 
 
A simple ground fatality model was used to 
illustrate the impact different safety objectives have 
on the design and operation of UAV systems. The 
model was applied to a number of possible 
applications in Queensland, Australia. The 
comparative examples highlighted the importance 
of the nature of risk exposure and the type of 
operation being performed. The examples also 
provided insight into how applications over 
different areas can drive the design requirements 
for systems. However, the results were limited by 
the simplicity of the model used and a more refined 
model is needed. This model should incorporate 
platform kinetic energy, conditional probability of 
injury (as well as fatality), population sheltering, 
temporal variations, varying failure modes, 
secondary hazards (such as fuel and dangerous 
payloads) or mitigation systems. It is important to 
note that the models used in this study focussed 
only on the risks to people on the ground. Risks 
presented to other airspace users are equally as 
important and should be further investigated. Other 
issues such as human error and those relating to 
ongoing airworthiness are not considered in this 
paper. 
Finally, a brief discussion on the factors 
influencing public acceptance was presented. As no 
study specific to UAV technologies has been 
identified, it was necessary to draw general 
guidance from literature and other technological 
risks. Public awareness of the technology and 
particularly its benefits will be important factors in 
gaining public acceptance. Specific study into the 
public’s response to UAV technologies is needed 
 
The purpose of this paper was not to define safety 
objectives but to incite discussion amongst the 
UAV industry and regulatory bodies. It is important 
that the UAV community recognise the impact 
safety objectives can have on the economic future 
of the UAV industry as well as the safety of other 
airspace users and people on the ground. 
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